How Chinese Intervention Reversed Resistance Gains in Myanmar’s Heartland

News Desk

China’s intervention in support of Myanmar’s regime in conflicts with ethnic armed groups near its border in northern Shan State has derailed efforts by the People’s Defense Force (PDF)—the armed wing of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG)—and its allies to capture Mandalay, the country’s second-largest city.

PDF groups recently ceded almost all of northern Mandalay to a regime counteroffensive featuring aircraft, drones and munitions almost certainly supplied by China, and troops redeployed from northern Shan following Beijing-brokered ceasefires with local ethnic armies.

As a result, the pro-democracy armed groups lost their chance to seize Mandalay after advancing as far as Patheingyi Township, just 22 km from the city and the junta’s Central Region Military Command.

Several other PDF groups control most of the territory south of the city.

During its Operation 1027 offensive, the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies—the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA)—allied with the PDF and other resistance forces to seize most of northern Shan State, including the capital Lashio, as of September 2024.

Meanwhile, Mandalay PDF groups, backed by the TNLA, captured Thabeikkyin and Singu townships and pushed into Madaya and Patheingyi, both bordering Mandalay city. The TNLA also seized Mogoke—Mandalay’s ruby hub—and nearby Mongmit in northern Shan with the help of PDF groups and other allies.

Chinese interference in Myanmar’s revolution

Observers and residents expected the PDF and the TNLA to advance on Mandalay and Pyin Oo Lwin, a junta garrison town and gateway to northern Shan located between TNLA-held Nawnghkio Township and Mandalay. Families of military personnel fled the garrison town, causing heavy traffic along the road to Mandalay.

However, the battlefield momentum shifted rapidly after China exerted pressure on the MNDAA and TNLA to halt their offensives against the regime.

Beijing closed its border gates, cutting food and medicine supplies to territory controlled by the ethnic armies while taking measures to prevent them procuring weapons and ammunition.

Beijing pushes UWSP to the brink

Beijing also clamped down on Shan State’s United Wa State Army (UWSA), Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic armed group, targeting business interests, seizing assets and sealing border crossings. The Wa subsequently agreed to halt supplies of weapons, equipment, military and financial assistance to three allied ethnic armies including the MNDAA and TNLA.

In August, 2025, the UWSP spoke out about the Chinese pressure.

“If we don’t end our support for your organizations, China will intensify its punitive measures,” UWSP vice chair Shao Guoan told representatives of the MNDAA, TNLA and Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP). “The pressure we face is already unbearable and has created the worst survival crisis in our 40-year history. We dare not imagine the consequences if China escalates it further.”

Chinese pressure on MNDAA

Beijing turned on the MNDAA in 2024, applying pressure that included the detention of its leader, Peng Daren.

The MNDAA promptly announced it would not attack Mandalay or Taunggyi, the capital of southern Shan State, and would not collaborate with the NUG or any international organizations that opposed China.

Meanwhile, the TNLA revealed it had also been pressured and threatened by Chinese authorities to stop fighting the regime. Both ethnic armies have since curbed their offensives.

Lashio: A limited hand-back

With its chief under house arrest in China, and facing other forms of pressure, the MNDAA was forced to hand back Lashio—which it had liberated together with resistance allies—to the regime in April 2025 after China-controlled peace talks in Kunming, Yunnan Province.

However, the MNDAA ceded control of urban wards but maintained its grip on rural Lashio – effectively encircling junta forces and preventing them from attacking surrounding townships still held by ethnic armies.

But the China-mediated ceasefire allowed the regime to reinforce counteroffensives against other townships under TNLA control. By October 2025, it had recaptured Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw—regaining control over the Myanmar-China trade route.

The recapture of Shan State townships, especially Nawnghkio, allowed regime forces to advance on PDF-controlled territory in northern Mandalay while cutting their supply routes.

Faced with escalating Chinese pressure, coupled with regime airstrikes targeting civilians in TNLA-held towns across northern Shan and Mandalay Region, the ethnic army struggled to govern liberated areas and was ultimately forced to hand back Mogoke and Mongmit to the regime during China-mediated peace talks in Kunming in late October 2025.

Former army captain Zin Yaw, who defected from the military following the 2021 coup, said that the ceasefire between the regime and the MNDAA shifted the burden onto the TNLA, making it the main target of the regime’s offensive in northern Shan State.

After enduring various hardships, the TNLA finally agreed to a China-mediated ceasefire with the regime and pledged to hand back Mogoke and Mongmit.

TNLA capitulation turns to collaboration

However, unlike the MNDAA, the TNLA forced its resistance allies—including PDF forces—to withdraw from positions around the towns, before escorting regime convoys during the handover. TNLA troops are now reportedly protecting regime forces in Mongmit from  the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and its allies, and aiding their expansion into rural parts of the township.

Despite seizing the town of Mogoke with the help of local PDF groups, the TNLA failed to win local support, residents say, citing abuses of power, poor administration and excessive ruby mining that disregarded community interests.

Regime forces recently managed to retake the road linking Thabeikkyin and Mogoke from PDF forces.

How the PDF lost its Mandalay stronghold  

A military analyst told The Irrawaddy that PDF supply lines in northern Mandalay were cut when its TNLA allies lost control of Nawnghkio along with the Mogoke-Pyin Oo Lwin road before handing back Mogoke and Mongmit to the regime.

“Caught in a pincer movement, the PDF had no choice but to withdraw from the areas it had liberated,” he said, citing the TNLA’s handover of territory as a crucial turning point.

He likened the episode to the TNLA offering medicine with one hand while wounding the Mandalay PDF with the other, cautioning it should serve as a lesson for PDF groups dealing with the ethnic army.

He also urged the PDF to reassess its alliances and military strategy in northern Mandalay, including their expectations and relations with other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).

Daw Ni Ni Kyaw, spokesperson for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has been fighting the regime alongside resistance groups in northern Shan, Mandalay, Sagaing and other regions, said one reason the Mandalay PDF had lost territory was its failure to build strong and effective ties with allies.

Its past battlefield successes had also led to overconfidence, further disrupting coordination and cooperation with allied forces, she added.

Mandalay PDF spokesperson Osmond did not response when contacted for comment on Friday.

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Military analysts said resistance-held areas in northern Mandalay have reverted to guerrilla zones, and that retaking territory lost to the regime would take time, regrouping, and strong coordination among resistance groups, including EAOs.

However, Beijing may prove to be the biggest obstacle to a resistance resurgence in Mandalay.

“If we cannot overcome Chinese pressure—which is also preventing ethnic armed groups from supplying weapons and ammunition to other resistance allies—it will be very difficult to retake territories lost to the regime,” said the PLA’s Daw Ni Ni Kyaw.

-The Irrawaddy