Strategic Balancing to Strategic Value Creation: A New Approach for Bangladesh

Dr. Sarder A. Haider

Bangladesh is entering a more demanding strategic environment. The Bay of Bengal is becoming increasingly important in Indo-Pacific politics. China, India, the United States, Japan and other powers have expanding economic and security interests in the region. At the same time, instability in Myanmar, competition over connectivity, energy insecurity, technological change and disruptions in global supply chains are creating new challenges for Bangladesh.

The usual advice is simple: Bangladesh should maintain good relations with all major powers and avoid choosing sides. This is sensible, but it is no longer enough. Bangladesh needs to move beyond strategic balancing towards strategic value creation. Instead of asking only how Bangladesh can balance competing powers, a more important question is: how can Bangladesh become so economically, geographically and strategically valuable that multiple powers have a strong interest in its stability, prosperity and autonomy?

From balancing to creating value

Strategic autonomy is sometimes understood as maintaining equal distance from competing powers. Complete equidistance, however, is neither possible nor necessary. Bangladesh can cooperate with different partners in different sectors: Japan in infrastructure, China in trade and investment, the United States and Europe in exports and technology, India in connectivity and energy, and ASEAN countries in regional economic integration.

The objective should not be equal relations with everyone. It should be to avoid excessive dependence on any single partner. This distinction matters. Strategic autonomy grows when a country is not only dependent on others, but also creates capabilities and services that others value. Strategic value creation therefore means converting Bangladesh’s geography, economy, institutions and human resources into bargaining power and durable partnerships.

Lessons from Singapore and Vietnam

Singapore offers a useful example. It is a small state in a region shaped by much larger powers, yet its influence is greater than its geographical size. It achieved this not through military power alone, but by developing world-class ports, logistics, finance, technology, infrastructure and institutions. It also built credible defence capabilities and wide diplomatic networks. Its experience shows how relevance to others can increase the strategic space available to a small state.

Vietnam offers a different lesson. Its “bamboo diplomacy” combines firm national interests with flexibility in external relations. Vietnam maintains extensive economic ties with China while also strengthening partnerships with the United States, Japan, India, South Korea and others. Its approach reflects independence, self-reliance, diversification and multilateral engagement.

Bangladesh cannot simply copy Singapore or Vietnam. Its geography, political economy and security environment are different. But both cases suggest a broader lesson: small and middle powers can increase their room for manoeuvre when they become valuable to several partners without becoming excessively dependent on one.

Turning geography into strategic value

Bangladesh already possesses important strategic assets. It sits at the northern end of the Bay of Bengal, between South and Southeast Asia, close to India’s Northeast and Myanmar, and near major Indian Ocean sea routes. Its ports can potentially serve not only Bangladesh but also parts of the surrounding region. Yet geography by itself does not create strategic power. Geography becomes an asset only when it is supported by infrastructure, institutions, connectivity and national capability.

Chattogram and Matarbari should therefore be viewed as more than ports. They can become parts of a wider regional logistics system linking the Bay of Bengal with India’s Northeast and, when political conditions permit, mainland Southeast Asia. Connectivity should be treated as an instrument of national strategy, not merely as a collection of infrastructure projects. Bangladesh should seek arrangements that generate domestic value, protect sovereignty and increase its importance to regional trade.

Building a Bay of Bengal knowledge and economic hub

Bangladesh should also think beyond transit and connectivity. The Bay of Bengal offers opportunities in shipbuilding and ship repair, fisheries, marine biotechnology, offshore energy, maritime services, coastal industries and ocean research. Chattogram could gradually develop into a blue-economy knowledge and technology hub. Universities, maritime institutions, ports, industry and research organisations could work together on marine science, maritime technology, shipbuilding and sustainable ocean-resource management.

The objective should be to move from simply using the sea to creating knowledge, technology and economic value from it. This would give Bangladesh a more distinctive role in the Bay of Bengal economy and reduce the risk that its geography is used mainly for the benefit of others.

Creating value in global supply chains

Bangladesh’s garment industry has already shown how integration into global supply chains can transform an economy. The next stage must be diversification and movement into higher-value activities. Pharmaceuticals, light engineering, electronics, agro-processing, shipbuilding, information technology and selected advanced manufacturing deserve greater attention.

LDC graduation makes this transition more urgent. Bangladesh should gradually move from an economy known mainly for low-cost labour towards one known for reliable production, skilled workers, innovation and competitive industrial capabilities. Economic strength is itself a source of strategic autonomy. A country dependent on a small number of products, markets or external suppliers has limited room for manoeuvre when geopolitical pressure increases.

Energy security as strategic security

Energy vulnerability can also restrict foreign-policy choices. Bangladesh therefore needs a diversified and resilient energy system rather than dependence on a single fuel, supplier or external market. Nuclear power, domestic gas, renewable energy, regional electricity trade, solar power, storage technology and grid modernisation can all contribute to this objective.

The strategic goal should be simple: affordable, reliable and less import-dependent energy. Reducing exposure to external price shocks and supply disruptions would strengthen industrial competitiveness, economic resilience and foreign-policy flexibility.

Security capabilities that protect autonomy

Strategic value creation does not mean neglecting defence. Bangladesh requires credible capabilities to protect its airspace, maritime territory, critical infrastructure and sovereign decision-making. But defence planning should increasingly address twenty-first-century risks. Maritime domain awareness, drones and counter-drone systems, cyber defence, electronic warfare, intelligence and surveillance, secure communications and resilient infrastructure will become increasingly important.

Bangladesh does not need military parity with major powers. It needs sufficient capability to make coercion difficult, uncertain and costly. Such a denial-oriented approach is a more realistic basis for deterrence and strategic autonomy.

Myanmar and the eastern strategic frontier

Myanmar cannot be separated from Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Bangladesh often discusses India, China and the United States while treating Myanmar mainly through the Rohingya crisis. That is too narrow. Myanmar is also Bangladesh’s physical gateway towards mainland Southeast Asia. At the same time, continuing conflict and fragmented authority in Rakhine create serious security, humanitarian and connectivity challenges.

A future political settlement in Myanmar could reopen possibilities for transport, trade and regional integration. Continued instability could produce the opposite outcome. Bangladesh therefore needs deeper institutional knowledge of Myanmar, Rakhine and the changing authorities operating there. This knowledge should support diplomacy, border management, humanitarian policy and long-term connectivity planning.

From hedging to strategic value creation

Bangladesh should not define its Indo-Pacific strategy mainly by asking whether it should move closer to China, India or the United States. That question gives external powers too much influence over the definition of Bangladesh’s own strategy. A better question is: what can Bangladesh build that China, India, Japan, the United States, Europe and Southeast Asia all find valuable?

The answer may include ports and logistics, reliable manufacturing, maritime services, blue-economy knowledge, disaster-response capacity, energy connectivity, digital infrastructure and stronger links between South and Southeast Asia. These capabilities would allow Bangladesh to offer value to several partners while protecting its own interests. The strategic progression can therefore be expressed simply:
Strategic Balancing → Strategic Diversification → Strategic Value Creation → Strategic Autonomy.

Strategic hedging provides part of the theoretical foundation for this approach because it helps smaller states preserve room for manoeuvre under uncertainty. But strategic value creation goes further. Hedging helps a country manage competition among others; strategic value creation seeks to increase what that country itself contributes to regional cooperation and competition.

Conclusion

Bangladesh’s long-term objective should not be neutrality for its own sake, nor does dependence on whichever partner offer the largest immediate benefit. It should be to build economic strength, technological capability, maritime relevance, energy resilience, credible security and effective diplomatic networks. The country should become increasingly valuable to multiple partners while remaining excessively dependent on none.

This is the essence of strategic value creation. It would give Bangladesh greater bargaining power and more freedom to protect its national interests. In an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific, “Bangladesh First” should therefore mean more than balancing external powers. It should mean building the national capabilities that make strategic autonomy possible.

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