Countering Aerial Threats: Lessons for Bangladesh from Manipur's Drone Attacks and Strategic Implications for the CHT

Understanding the Manipur Drone Attacks

The drone attacks in Manipur on September 1st and 2nd, 2024, marked a significant escalation in the region’s ethnic conflict. The first attack occurred in the Meitei-dominated village of Koutruk, near Kangpokpi, a district inhabited primarily by the Kuki-Zomi community. Drones carrying explosives were deployed, resulting in two civilian deaths, including a woman, and injuring nine others. The second attack, in the nearby village of Senjam Chirang Maning Leikai, injured three more civilians in a similar drone bomb attack.

These incidents introduced a new dimension to the conflict, with insurgents launching drones from Kuki-Zomi areas in the hills, utilizing the rugged terrain to their advantage. The drones were likely locally assembled, using readily available commercial parts and capable of carrying explosive payloads with accuracy. The explosives were believed to be sourced from looted police armories, showcasing the insurgents’ ability to exploit security vulnerabilities.

The primary actors behind these attacks are suspected to be militant factions linked to the Kuki-Zomi community, although definitive identification remains challenging due to the complex insurgent networks in the region. The use of drones marks a tactical evolution among these groups, shifting from traditional guerrilla warfare to technologically advanced attacks, maximizing psychological impact while minimizing direct confrontation.

The drones used were likely assembled from commercially available components, such as rotor-fitted quadcopters, which can be modified to carry explosives. These drones, costing between ₹30,000 to ₹2.5 lakh, can be assembled quickly and are fitted with simple mechanisms to release explosives, allowing insurgents to strike from a safe distance. Additionally, the use of looted ammunition, such as grenades and mortar bombs, indicates that insurgents are sustaining their activities despite government-imposed “buffer zones” and shoot-at-sight orders.

The Manipur government responded swiftly to the drone attacks. Chief Minister N. Biren Singh condemned the attacks as “acts of terrorism” and announced immediate measures to investigate and prevent future incidents.

A five-member committee, comprising officers from the state police, Army, and paramilitary forces, was formed to examine the drones used, collect evidence, and recommend countermeasures. The committee’s mandate includes studying drone technology, identifying component origins, and developing protocols to prevent future attacks. The government also sought assistance from the National Security Guard (NSG), India’s elite counter-terrorism unit, whose experts were deployed to provide training in drone detection, interception, and neutralization.

Further measures included extensive combing operations by state police in areas near Imphal West, aimed at dismantling insurgent networks and securing the region. Coordination with central forces, including the Indian Army and Assam Rifles, was enhanced to create a unified response and ensure effective intelligence sharing. Some political leaders, however, have called for the withdrawal of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), arguing that they have not restored law and order effectively.

The Manipur government’s response involves both immediate and long-term strategies. Immediate actions, such as forming the probe committee, conducting combing operations, and coordinating with central forces, aim to address the immediate threat and demonstrate the government’s resolve. The involvement of NSG experts fills gaps in local capabilities for detecting and neutralizing drones.

Long-term strategies focus on building resilience against future drone attacks. These include investing in advanced surveillance technologies like radar systems capable of detecting small drones and developing electronic countermeasures to disable drones mid-flight. Enhanced intelligence-gathering capabilities are also essential to monitor insurgent activities closely and prevent the acquisition of drone technology.

Additionally, the government recognizes the importance of collaboration with national security agencies and the need for new legislation to regulate drone use and control the sale of drone components. These measures are vital to staying ahead of insurgents and effectively mitigating future drone threats.

Security Landscape in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in southeastern Bangladesh is a region characterized by ethnic diversity and a history of conflict and insurgency. Several armed groups operate in the CHT, each pursuing distinct objectives linked to autonomy, ethnic rights, land ownership, and development.

Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS) – Santu Larma Faction: Formed in the 1970s, this group is one of the oldest insurgent organizations in the CHT, advocating for the rights of ethnic tribal communities, such as the Chakma, Marma, and Tripuri. Despite the 1997 CHT Peace Accord, which promised greater autonomy, the group remains active due to dissatisfaction with the Accord’s implementation, continuing its political and occasional armed activities.

Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS) – Reformist Faction: A breakaway from the main JSS in the early 2000s, this faction remains involved in political maneuvering and has engaged in violent clashes over resource control and influence, although it is less influential than the original group.

United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) – Prosit Faction: Established in 1998 in opposition to the CHT Peace Accord, this faction demands full autonomy for the ethnic tribal communities and rejects the legitimacy of the CHT Regional Council. It is involved in extortion, armed conflict with rival factions, and has been accused of human rights abuses.

United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) – Democratic Faction: Split from the UPDF in 2017 over ideological differences, this faction also engages in political advocacy and occasional armed conflicts, primarily with its parent group and other rivals.

Marma National Party (MNP): Representing the Marma community, the MNP is smaller than the JSS and UPDF factions but is involved in local disputes over land, resources, and political influence. It has clashed with other groups over territorial control and representation.

Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF): A newer group, the KNF represents the Kuki-Chin community, which has ethnic ties with Northeast India, particularly Manipur and some factions in Myanmar. There are concerns that the KNF is collaborating with Manipur-based insurgents in intelligence sharing, training, and acquiring arms, including drones, posing a potential threat in the CHT.

The KNF’s possible ties with Manipur insurgents are a concern for Bangladesh’s security. Such connections could facilitate the transfer of tactics and technology, including drones, which were recently used by Manipur insurgents. This risk could introduce similar threats in the CHT, where rugged terrain and strategic locations favor drone operations, making them hard for traditional security forces to counter.

Current Security Measures in CHT

The government of Bangladesh employs several strategies to maintain security in the CHT, including:

Military Presence: The Bangladesh Army has established numerous camps and checkpoints throughout the CHT, conducting operations to maintain law and order, counter insurgency, and support civil administration.

Intelligence Analysis: Several intelligence agencies are actively monitoring the armed groups’ activities, gathering data on movements, communications, and preventing attacks.

Community Engagement and Development: The government fosters trust through development initiatives aimed at reducing the influence of armed groups by improving infrastructure, healthcare, education, and economic opportunities.

Limitations of the Current Framework in Addressing Aerial Threats

Despite these efforts, the security framework in CHT faces challenges in countering aerial threats:

Inadequate Aerial Surveillance: The lack of radar systems and electronic countermeasures makes it difficult to detect and neutralize drones.

Lack of Specialized Training and Equipment: Local forces may lack the expertise and tools needed to handle drone threats effectively.

Intelligence Gaps: Existing intelligence efforts may not sufficiently address new threats like drones, which require advanced technologies such as signal intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic warfare capabilities.

Geographical Challenges: The dense forests and rugged terrain favor insurgents, complicating drone detection and countermeasures.

Insufficient Legal Framework: The absence of comprehensive regulations governing drone use and counter-drone actions hampers security forces’ ability to preemptively tackle aerial threats.

These gaps highlight the need for Bangladesh to reassess and strengthen its security strategy in the CHT, especially in light of emerging aerial threats and potential cross-border connections.

Assessing the KNF’s Potential Connections with Manipur Insurgents

The Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) is an insurgent group operating in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh. Formed in the early 2000s, the KNF represents the interests of the Kuki-Chin ethnic community, including sub-groups like the Bawm, Pangkho, and Mro. The Kuki-Chin people share cultural, ethnic, and historical ties with the Chin-Kuki-Mizo groups in Northeast India, particularly in Manipur and Mizoram.

Objectives: The KNF’s primary objective is to secure greater autonomy and self-determination for the Kuki-Chin people in the CHT. The group advocates for the recognition of Kuki-Chin identity and the creation of a separate administrative region within Bangladesh, similar to the existing CHT Regional Council but focused on the specific rights and interests of the Kuki-Chin community. The KNF’s activities are driven by grievances over land rights, cultural preservation, and perceived development disparities that they believe have marginalized their community compared to others in the CHT.

Organizational Structure: The KNF operates with a decentralized structure, led by a chairman, a general secretary, and a military wing commander. The military wing of KNF is responsible for armed operations, including ambushes, raids, and extortion, which support the group’s political goals. Additionally, the KNF maintains a political wing that engages in advocacy and negotiations with local authorities and other stakeholders.

Recent Activities: In recent years, the KNF has intensified its activities in the remote areas of Bandarban districts in the CHT. On April 4, 2024, members of the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) executed an armed robbery at the Sonali Bank branch in Ruma, Bandarban, Bangladesh. During this incident, the KNF reportedly looted over Tk 15 million and took 14 weapons from the Ansar members who were guarding the bank. The robbery occurred while many were attending Taraweeh prayers at a nearby mosque, allowing the attackers to catch the guards and bank staff off guard. This group also carried out a series of attacks in Thanchi, Bandarban, Bangladesh over a short period of time in April 2024.

Intelligence Exchanges: The KNF is suspected of engaging in intelligence exchanges with Manipur insurgent groups, such as the Kuki National Organization (KNO) and its armed wing, the Kuki National Army (KNA). These exchanges may involve sharing information on troop movements, security deployments, and potential targets in both Bangladesh and India. Such collaboration is facilitated by the porous border and the ethnic ties between the Kuki-Chin and Kuki groups on both sides.

Training and Joint Operations: Some KNF members are reported to have received training from insurgent groups in Manipur, including guerrilla warfare tactics, explosives handling, and the use of modern communication equipment. There may have been joint operations or exercises conducted in the dense forests along the Bangladesh-India border, aimed at enhancing combat readiness and fostering mutual trust between the groups.

Arms and Logistics Support: The KNF’s involvement in cross-border arms trafficking networks suggests a connection with Manipur insurgents. The KNF is believed to have obtained arms and ammunition, including light weapons and explosives, through smuggling routes linking the CHT with insurgent strongholds in Northeast India. These arms may have been acquired from stockpiles held by Manipur insurgent groups or other regional suppliers.

Implications of the KNF-Manipur Connection for Bangladesh

A potential alliance or cooperation between the KNF and Manipur insurgents could escalate security challenges in the CHT:

Enhanced Insurgent Capabilities: Cooperation with Manipur-based groups could significantly enhance the KNF’s operational capabilities, enabling them to conduct more sophisticated attacks in the CHT. This could include improved ambush tactics, better use of terrain for guerrilla warfare, and more effective methods of evading security forces.

Cross-Border Threats and Regional Instability: A strengthened alliance could lead to increased cross-border movement of fighters, arms, and resources, complicating the security situation for Bangladesh. Insurgent groups could use the CHT as a base for launching attacks into India or as a safe haven after operations across the border, potentially affecting bilateral relations and regional stability.

Escalation of Violence and Advanced Tactics: Collaboration between the KNF and Manipur insurgents could introduce more advanced tactics and weaponry into the CHT conflict, including the use of drones for surveillance, reconnaissance, or attacks. Drones could allow the KNF to strike with greater precision and from greater distances, challenging Bangladesh’s counterinsurgency efforts.

Impact on Local Communities and Governance: Increased insurgent activity and the use of advanced tactics like drones could lead to higher civilian casualties, displacement, and disruption of daily life, complicating efforts to maintain law and order. These developments could undermine the credibility of the Bangladeshi government, particularly if local communities feel inadequately protected from these threats.

Possible Use of Drones in the CHT Context: The KNF’s connections with Manipur insurgents raise concerns about the adoption of drone tactics in the CHT. Drones could be used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and even direct attacks, significantly escalating the conflict and posing new challenges for Bangladesh’s security forces. The psychological impact of drones could also weaken morale among security personnel and local communities, further destabilizing the region.

Lessons from Manipur for Bangladesh

The recent drone attacks in Manipur illustrate a significant shift in insurgent tactics from traditional methods, like guerrilla warfare and small arms attacks, to using advanced technologies such as drones. This evolution shows that insurgent groups are adapting to new technological realities, employing tools that provide strategic advantages. Drones allow insurgents to conduct surveillance, gather intelligence, and carry out precise strikes without direct engagement, minimizing their risk while maximizing impact.

For Bangladesh, especially in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), understanding this shift is critical. The CHT is home to several insurgent groups, including the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF), which may have links to insurgents in Manipur. If groups like the KNF adopt similar tactics, Bangladesh could face threats that current security measures are not designed to handle. Drones could be used for surveillance, delivering explosives, or transporting supplies across difficult terrain, making it vital for Bangladesh to anticipate these threats and invest in appropriate countermeasures.

Need for Preparedness in the CHT

Bangladesh must recognize that the security landscape in the CHT is dynamic, with insurgent groups potentially learning from regional developments. The use of drones by insurgents in Manipur serves as a warning that groups like the KNF could adopt similar methods. To prepare for these threats, Bangladesh should focus on:

Comprehensive Threat Assessment: Analyzing the capabilities and intentions of insurgent groups in the CHT, especially those with potential connections to Manipur.

Upgrading Security Infrastructure: Investing in technologies and training for detecting, tracking, and neutralizing drones and other aerial threats.

Raising Awareness and Training: Ensuring military, police, and intelligence personnel are equipped with the skills to respond effectively to evolving threats.

Importance of Rapid Response and Coordination

Manipur’s experience highlights the need for a rapid, coordinated response involving multiple agencies. The swift formation of a committee involving state police, the army, and paramilitary forces to respond to the drone attacks demonstrates the effectiveness of such an approach. For Bangladesh, a similar mechanism in the CHT could be crucial. Establishing a dedicated task force or inter-agency coordination mechanism focused on aerial threats would help integrate military, law enforcement, and intelligence capabilities under a unified command.

Key features of this task force could include:

Real-Time Intelligence Sharing: Secure channels for rapid information exchange between agencies.

Specialized Training and Equipment: Training personnel in drone detection, interception, and neutralization, and equipping them with counter-drone technologies.

Rapid Deployment Units: Units capable of quickly responding to drone sightings or attacks, using both ground and aerial assets.

Leveraging Technology and Expertise

Bangladesh can learn from Manipur’s experience by using technology to counter aerial threats. Surveillance drones can monitor remote areas, gather intelligence on insurgent movements, and detect threats before they materialize. Bangladesh should also invest in counter-drone systems, including radar and acoustic sensors, jammers, and interceptor drones, and develop electronic warfare capabilities to disrupt drones’ communication.

International Collaboration: Bangladesh could benefit from partnering with countries like the U.S., and the U.K., which have experience with drone threats. Collaboration could include joint training exercises, technical assistance, and participation in global forums on counter-drone strategies, helping Bangladesh enhance its capacity to counter aerial threats.

By leveraging technology and collaborating with international experts, Bangladesh can better prepare to address the evolving tactics of insurgent groups in the CHT.

Developing a Proactive Strategy for Bangladesh

To counter potential drone threats and insurgent activities, Bangladesh should deploy advanced surveillance technologies in border areas and insurgency-prone zones, especially in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Aerial drones equipped with high-resolution cameras, infrared sensors, and night-vision capabilities can provide real-time data and imagery, detecting insurgent movements in hard-to-reach areas. These drones could be programmed to monitor specific routes or hover over areas of interest, such as suspected camps or smuggling routes, and enhanced with AI-powered software for automatic target recognition.

Additionally, installing ground-based surveillance systems like radar and acoustic sensors at key border points and high-risk zones can help detect low-flying drones, creating an integrated network that improves early warning capabilities and enables timely responses.

Strengthening Intelligence Networks

Bangladesh must also strengthen intelligence networks to detect and preempt drone threats, particularly from groups like the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF). This includes enhancing both human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT):

HUMINT Capabilities: Expanding networks of local informants and community liaisons to gather information on insurgent activities, such as movements and drone acquisitions.

SIGINT and Cyber Intelligence: Utilizing electronic surveillance to intercept communications related to drone operations and establishing a cyber intelligence unit to analyze these communications and provide early warnings.

Cross-Border Intelligence Sharing: Strengthening cooperation with regional intelligence agencies in India and Myanmar to share information on insurgent activities and drone threats.

Training Programs for Drone Threats

Bangladesh should invest in comprehensive training programs for security personnel, covering drone detection, interception, and neutralization:

Detection and Surveillance: Training in advanced detection technologies, including radar, infrared sensors, and acoustic devices, to identify drones.

Interception Techniques: Educating personnel on using jammers and interceptor drones to disrupt or disable rogue drones, and tactical deployment in coordination with ground units.

Neutralization Tactics: Training in electronic warfare (EW), kinetic methods like anti-drone guns or nets, and cyber tactics to hack drones.

Bangladesh should procure modern counter-drone equipment, such as electronic warfare systems to disrupt drone signals, kinetic countermeasures like anti-drone guns, and AI algorithms to enhance detection and response strategies.

Developing Regulations on Drone Use

Bangladesh must establish a robust legal framework to govern drone use and counter-drone operations:

Regulating Civilian Drone Usage: Introducing licensing, operational zones, and safety measures for drone operators and restricting high-end drones’ import and sale.

Empowering Security Forces: Granting authority to detect, intercept, and neutralize unauthorized drones and establishing protocols for coordinated responses.

Defining Penalties and Enforcement: Setting clear penalties for illegal drone use, including fines, imprisonment, and equipment confiscation.

Engaging in Regional Cooperation

Bangladesh should engage in regional cooperation to monitor and manage drone threats:

Agreements with Neighboring Countries: For joint monitoring, data sharing, and cross-border pursuit.

Regional Monitoring Networks: Establishing networks with sensors and radars for early detection.

Participation in Security Forums: Engaging in BIMSTEC to share strategies and build consensus on aerial threats.

By enhancing surveillance, building capacity, and developing a comprehensive legal framework, Bangladesh can effectively counter drone threats and ensure stability in the CHT and other vulnerable areas.

Public Awareness and Community Engagement

Educating local communities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) about drone threats is crucial for countering insurgent activities effectively. As the first observers of unusual or suspicious activities, local residents play a vital role in identifying and reporting potential drone threats. Awareness programs should inform communities about how drones may be used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and attacks, and teach them to recognize the appearance, sounds, and flight patterns of drones.

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Awareness campaigns can be conducted through community meetings, local leaders, and distributing informative materials in local languages to reach all demographic groups. Additionally, establishing accessible reporting mechanisms, such as hotlines or mobile apps, will encourage timely reporting of drone sightings or suspicious behavior, enabling security forces to receive real-time information and respond swiftly to potential threats.

Involving local schools, religious institutions, and community organizations can further extend outreach. Emphasizing youth education is essential, as younger generations are often more familiar with technology and can help bridge the gap between traditional knowledge and modern threats.

Promoting Community Participation in Security Efforts

Community-based vigilance is essential in the CHT, where challenging terrain can limit conventional surveillance methods. Active participation by local communities can create a collaborative approach to countering drone threats and insurgent activities.

Forming Community Watch Groups: Establishing volunteer-based watch groups in villages and towns can help monitor and report drone activities. These groups, trained to recognize signs of drone presence, can coordinate with law enforcement and military units, providing valuable intelligence and deterring insurgent operations.

Leveraging Local Knowledge: Communities have a deep understanding of local terrain and movement patterns. Engaging them in security efforts can enhance surveillance effectiveness, as they can help identify likely areas for drone launches or insurgent bases.

Building Trust with Security Forces: Effective community participation requires trust between residents and security forces. Transparency, respect for human rights, and regular communication can foster trust, ensuring that community concerns are heard and contributions are recognized.

Supporting Government Initiatives: Encouraging community involvement in local security measures, such as identifying strategic surveillance points or participating in emergency drills, fosters cooperation and shared responsibility.

Incentivizing Participation: Offering incentives, such as financial rewards, public recognition, or access to development projects, can motivate communities to remain vigilant, fostering a sense of ownership and proactive involvement in maintaining local security.

By raising awareness and promoting community participation, Bangladesh can establish a robust defense against insurgent activities in the CHT, enhancing security measures and building resilience among local communities.

Conclusion

The recent drone attacks in Manipur offer critical lessons for Bangladesh, underscoring the need to adapt to the evolving tactics of insurgent groups. Manipur’s experience demonstrates how quickly insurgents can adopt advanced technologies like drones, significantly altering the security landscape. These attacks highlight the importance of recognizing the shift from traditional insurgency methods to sophisticated strategies, such as using drones for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeted strikes. The situation also emphasizes the necessity of rapid, coordinated responses and modern technologies to counter new aerial threats.

For Bangladesh, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), these lessons are highly relevant. The potential connections between local insurgent groups like the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) and insurgents in Manipur suggest that similar tactics could emerge in the CHT. This possibility calls for a proactive counter-drone strategy that includes enhancing surveillance, building capacity and training, and developing robust legal and policy frameworks.

A unified approach involving policymakers, security forces, and communities is essential to safeguard national security. Prioritizing funding, training, and community engagement, along with monitoring potential alliances, will be key to preventing violence and the use of advanced tactics like drones in the CHT.

By learning from Manipur’s experience and implementing these measures, Bangladesh can strengthen its defenses against future threats and ensure a secure environment in the CHT and beyond.

[1] PhD Researcher, Bangladesh University of Professionals.

References

[1] Indian Express (2024) ‘Drone attacks in Imphal West: CM Biren Singh says Manipur “will fight such forms of terrorism”’, Indian Express, 3 September. Available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/india/manipur-cm-n-biren-singh-drone-attacks-death-injured-9547288/lite/ (Accessed: 4 September 2024).

[2] Singh, V. (2024) ‘Manipur drone attack: Looted ammunition said to have been used’, The Hindu, 4 September. Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/manipur/drones-used-in-manipur-violence-may-have-been-assembled-locally/article68602252.ece (Accessed: 4 September 2024).

[3] Kalika, P. (2024) ‘As militant drones drop bombs, Manipur forces seek NSG help’, The Times of India, 4 September. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/as-militant-drones-drop-bombs-manipur-forces-seek-nsg-help/articleshow/113045164.cms (Accessed:4 September 2024).