Engaging Non-State Actors: India's Strategic Dialogue with Myanmar's Opposition and Its Implications for Northeast India and Lessons for Bangladesh

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Sarder A. Haider[1]

Introduction

In a notable departure from its earlier diplomatic stance, India has recently extended invitations to key non-state actors from Myanmar, including political opponents and ethnic armed groups, to participate in a seminar hosted by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) in New Delhi. This seminar, scheduled for mid-November, marks India’s first formal engagement with anti-junta factions since the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021. The participants invited include representatives from the National Unity Government (NUG) a parallel government formed by pro-democracy leaders and various ethnic armed groups, such as the Chin National Front (CNF), Arakan Army (AA), and Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The key topics slated for discussion are constitutionalism and federalism, though the exact agenda remains fluid.

This engagement is significant as it indicates a shift in India’s approach toward Myanmar. While India has historically refrained from taking sides in Myanmar’s internal conflicts, its decision to engage with anti-junta forces signals a growing concern over the deteriorating situation across the border and its potential repercussions on regional stability. With Myanmar still in turmoil and the junta struggling to maintain control, India’s outreach to these groups can be seen as an attempt to foster dialogue while addressing both security and geopolitical challenges in the region.

Since Myanmar’s military seized power in 2021, the country has been engulfed in civil conflict, with widespread violence and a growing resistance movement. India, which shares a 1,650-kilometer border with Myanmar, has maintained a careful balancing act. On one hand, India’s strategic interests such as infrastructure projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) depend on stable relations with Myanmar’s military regime. On the other, the growing unrest poses direct security threats to India, particularly in its Northeastern states, where insurgent groups have historically found sanctuary in Myanmar.

India’s initial response to the coup was cautious, with New Delhi refraining from openly criticizing the military junta to avoid pushing it further into China’s sphere of influence. However, the intensification of violence, the breakdown of governance in Myanmar, and the potential for cross-border insurgent activity have prompted India to reassess its approach. Engaging with non-state actors such as the NUG and ethnic armed organizations represents a strategic shift, allowing India to build relationships with pro-democracy factions while retaining its traditional ties to the junta. This dual approach reflects India’s broader foreign policy of pragmatism, where balancing immediate security concerns with long-term geopolitical goals is key.

This article aims to explore the future scenarios that may arise from India’s engagement with Myanmar’s non-state actors, with a particular focus on the implications for Northeast India. The Northeastern region, already beset by its own insurgencies and ethnic tensions, is vulnerable to spillover effects from Myanmar’s civil war. India’s outreach to anti-junta forces could potentially mitigate these risks but also carries significant dangers, such as inflaming local insurgencies or triggering refugee crises.

At the same time, Bangladesh, which shares a similar border dynamic with Myanmar, faces its own set of challenges. Drawing lessons from India’s evolving strategy, Bangladesh can glean important insights into managing cross-border instability, engaging with non-state actors, and safeguarding its own security interests. By comparing the situation in Northeast India and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh, this article will highlight the potential strategies that Bangladesh could adopt to address regional security threats while fostering stability and development.

In essence, the article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of how India’s engagement with Myanmar’s non-state actors will shape the future security, political, and economic landscape of its northeastern region, while also offering valuable lessons for Bangladesh as it navigates its own complex relationship with Myanmar.

India’s Strategic Engagement with Myanmar’s Non-State Actors

The February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, led by General Min Aung Hlaing, ousted the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government and plunged the country into chaos. Protests erupted nationwide, leading to a brutal military crackdown that has claimed thousands of civilian lives and displaced millions. The coup effectively ended a decade of quasi-civilian rule, where Myanmar had witnessed slow but steady political reforms. The conflict has since spiraled into a civil war, with resistance movements forming across the country.

The junta’s attempt to consolidate power has been met with fierce opposition from both the National Unity Government (NUG) —a parallel government composed of ousted elected officials and pro-democracy forces and various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), which have long fought for autonomy in Myanmar’s border regions. Ethnic groups like the Chin National Front (CNF), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and Arakan Army (AA) have significantly escalated their military campaigns against the junta, complicating the already volatile situation.

These non-state actors have coalesced into a broad coalition of resistance against the military regime. The NUG, in particular, has garnered widespread support among Myanmar’s population and gained international recognition from several Western countries. Meanwhile, EAOs like the CNF, KIA, and AA have mobilized their forces, seeking both autonomy and democratic reforms. The civil war has led to widespread human rights violations, with Myanmar’s citizens caught between the junta and these armed resistance groups.

The Military Coup in 2021 and Its Repercussions: The repercussions of the coup have been profound. Economically, Myanmar has experienced a dramatic collapse, with sanctions from Western countries isolating the junta and plunging the nation into economic hardship. International condemnation of the coup has been widespread, though neighboring countries like China, Thailand, and India have been more cautious in their approach, owing to strategic interests. Humanitarian crises, including mass displacement, food insecurity, and refugee outflows, have exacerbated the regional security situation.

The rise of non-state actors like the NUG and ethnic armed groups has fundamentally altered the dynamics of Myanmar’s conflict. These actors have taken control of significant territories, undermining the junta’s efforts to reassert control. They have also gained support from diaspora groups and international civil society organizations, while engaging in sporadic diplomacy to gather international backing.

The Role of Non-State Actors

National Unity Government (NUG): The NUG serves as a government-in-exile, comprising members of Myanmar’s dissolved parliament, activists, and ethnic leaders. It is spearheading both diplomatic efforts to gain recognition from the international community and the armed struggle against the junta through its People’s Defense Force (PDF). The NUG aims to establish a federal democracy in Myanmar and has been endorsed by several Western governments, though countries in the region have been more reticent.

Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)

Chin National Front (CNF): Operating primarily in Chin State, the CNF has historically fought for autonomy and cultural preservation for the Chin people. Since the coup, the CNF has become a key ally of the NUG, ramping up military activities against the junta.

Kachin Independence Army (KIA): One of Myanmar’s oldest and most powerful ethnic militias, the KIA has been fighting for greater autonomy for Kachin State. The KIA has consistently opposed the junta and maintained control over substantial territory in northern Myanmar, aligning with the NUG in the post-coup conflict.

Arakan Army (AA): The AA, primarily based in Rakhine State, has historically sought greater autonomy for the Rakhine people. While previously engaged in peace negotiations with the junta, the AA has become increasingly confrontational since the coup, targeting military positions and forming alliances with other ethnic groups resisting the military regime.

These groups, united by their opposition to the military junta, pose significant challenges to the regime’s attempts to consolidate power. They also represent key players in any potential post-conflict political arrangement, particularly if the NUG succeeds in gaining broader legitimacy.

India’s Policy Shift

India’s relationship with Myanmar has historically been pragmatic, focusing on security, trade, and geopolitical considerations rather than ideological alignment. New Delhi has maintained a cautious approach to Myanmar’s political landscape, driven by a need to balance regional security concerns with economic and strategic interests. The 2021 coup forced India into a difficult position, as it had long cultivated ties with Myanmar’s military while also engaging with pro-democracy forces like Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD.

India’s ties with Myanmar’s military stretch back decades. During the Cold War, India initially supported Myanmar’s pro-democracy movements but shifted its approach in the 1990s to engage with the military junta, driven by security and economic concerns. This shift occurred in part due to the rise of China’s influence in Myanmar, as Beijing became one of the junta’s closest allies. India, seeking to counterbalance China’s growing regional dominance, pursued a policy of “constructive engagement” with the junta, focusing on infrastructure projects, trade, and counter-insurgency operations along the Indo-Myanmar border.

For India, maintaining strong ties with Myanmar’s military was also crucial for controlling insurgent groups operating in its northeastern states. Myanmar’s military has, on several occasions, cooperated with Indian forces to suppress cross-border insurgencies, helping New Delhi maintain stability in its restive Northeast.

India’s Strategic Reasons for Engaging with Anti-Junta Forces

The deterioration of Myanmar’s internal security and the rise of powerful non-state actors forced India to reconsider its traditional engagement with the military regime. Several strategic factors underpin this shift:

Security Concerns: The ongoing conflict in Myanmar has significantly increased instability along India’s northeastern border. Insurgent groups, such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), have historically operated from Myanmar. As Myanmar’s control weakens, the risk of these insurgent groups gaining ground has risen. By engaging with anti-junta forces, India aims to mitigate this threat by potentially securing cooperation from groups like the CNF, KIA, and AA.

Infrastructure Projects: India’s flagship infrastructure projects, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, are critical to its “Act East” policy, which seeks to improve connectivity with Southeast Asia. These projects are jeopardized by the ongoing instability in Myanmar. Engaging with non-state actors who control significant portions of territory in Myanmar could ensure smoother implementation of these projects.

Balancing China’s Influence: China has been Myanmar’s most consistent supporter, both before and after the coup. Beijing’s extensive economic and military ties to the junta have allowed it to wield significant influence over Myanmar’s government. India, by engaging with non-state actors like the NUG and ethnic armed groups, hopes to counterbalance China’s influence and secure a foothold in Myanmar’s future political landscape.

India’s engagement with Myanmar’s anti-junta forces is a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, supporting pro-democracy forces like the NUG aligns with India’s broader democratic values and enhances its regional standing as a proponent of democratic governance. It also helps India build goodwill among Myanmar’s population, which largely supports the NUG.

On the other hand, India cannot afford to completely alienate Myanmar’s military regime, which remains in power and is crucial for maintaining security along the Indo-Myanmar border. By engaging with both the military and anti-junta forces, India seeks to navigate the complexities of Myanmar’s internal conflict while protecting its own security and strategic interests. This balancing act allows India to hedge its bets, ensuring that it remains a key player in Myanmar’s future, regardless of the conflict’s outcome.

Potential Outcomes for Northeast India

Security Concerns: Myanmar’s ongoing civil war and the involvement of ethnic armed groups pose a significant security threat to India’s Northeastern states. India shares a 1,650-km-long porous border with Myanmar, which has historically been a route for arms smuggling, insurgent movement, and cross-border trafficking. Insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur have long operated from Myanmar’s border areas, finding refuge in the lawless regions under the control of ethnic armed groups. The breakdown of governance in Myanmar due to the civil war has further weakened border security, exacerbating these threats.

The collaboration between India and anti-junta groups, while beneficial for regional stability, may create complications in maintaining border security. As ethnic armed groups like the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Chin National Front (CNF), and Arakan Army (AA) increase their military activities against the junta, the likelihood of these groups using India’s Northeastern states as a safe haven increases. This may not only intensify insurgent activity but also heighten the risk of cross-border incursions. Manipur and Mizoram, two states with long histories of insurgency, are particularly vulnerable due to their proximity to Myanmar and the historical linkages between insurgent groups on both sides of the border.

The Risk of Heightened Insurgent Activity: Manipur and Mizoram, both bordering Myanmar, are crucial to India’s security calculus in the Northeast. Mizoram has seen an influx of refugees from Myanmar’s Chin State, and there are strong ethnic ties between the Chin and Mizo communities. The state has generally been stable since the Mizo insurgency ended in the 1980s, but the recent turmoil in Myanmar has led to concerns that the cross-border ethnic solidarity could reignite unrest. Similarly, Manipur, with its history of ethnic insurgencies and separatist movements, is particularly sensitive to the developments in Myanmar. The presence of Manipuri insurgent groups in Myanmar, such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and UNLF (United National Liberation Front), complicates India’s border security strategy. Increased collaboration between these insurgents and Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups could provide these insurgent movements with renewed strength and resources, destabilizing the region further.

India’s engagement with anti-junta forces may also have unintended consequences. By allying with ethnic groups like the CNF or KIA, India risks creating new power dynamics that may embolden insurgent groups within its own territory. This risk underscores the need for India to tread carefully in its dealings with Myanmar’s non-state actors, ensuring that such alliances do not inadvertently destabilize its Northeastern states.

Refugee Influx

The civil war in Myanmar has already led to a significant refugee crisis, with thousands of people fleeing the conflict into neighboring countries. India, particularly its Northeastern states of Mizoram and Manipur, has seen a steady influx of refugees from Myanmar. Many of these refugees come from ethnic communities such as the Chin, who have ethnic and cultural ties to the Mizo people in India. While Mizoram has shown considerable compassion in welcoming refugees, the continuous influx poses a strain on local resources and creates the potential for social unrest.

The refugee crisis has impacted local economies in these border states. Mizoram, one of India’s smaller and less economically developed states, is struggling to accommodate the increasing number of refugees. Local infrastructure, including health care, housing, and social services, is overstretched, and there is rising concern about the sustainability of these efforts. Moreover, tensions could escalate if refugees are perceived as competing for local jobs or resources, leading to friction between the host communities and asylum seekers.

The management of this refugee influx is a significant challenge for India. While India has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has historically maintained a policy of providing shelter to those fleeing conflict. However, the lack of a formal refugee policy means that refugees from Myanmar face uncertainty regarding their legal status, access to social services, and long-term protection. Additionally, the arrival of more refugees could increase ethnic tensions within border states, as communities may feel overwhelmed by the growing number of asylum seekers.

For instance, the Mizo community has a strong cultural connection with the Chin people of Myanmar, but prolonged pressure on local resources could lead to friction. Effective management will require India to coordinate with local governments, international organizations, and community leaders to ensure that both humanitarian needs and security concerns are addressed.

Ethnic Tensions

Northeast India is a region known for its complex ethnic mosaic, with numerous indigenous groups, many of whom have long-standing grievances with the Indian state. India’s engagement with ethnic armed groups in Myanmar could inadvertently deepen divisions within its Northeastern communities. Ethnic solidarity between groups on both sides of the India-Myanmar border means that any political or military alignment with specific groups in Myanmar could affect the internal dynamics of Northeast India.

For example, India’s support for ethnic groups like the Chin National Front (CNF) might be perceived by other ethnic communities in India’s Northeast as preferential treatment. This could trigger resentment among groups like the Naga or the Kuki, who may feel that India is aligning with their rivals across the border. The history of inter-ethnic violence in states like Manipur and Nagaland adds to the sensitivity of the situation. India must be cautious in ensuring that its foreign policy actions do not unintentionally fuel ethnic conflicts within its own borders.

India’s engagement with Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, such as the CNF, Arakan Army (AA), and Kachin Independence Army (KIA), will likely have ripple effects in Northeast India. These groups, many of which represent ethnic minorities in Myanmar, have historical and cultural ties with communities in India’s Northeast. For instance, the Mizo people in India share ethnic and linguistic ties with the Chin people in Myanmar. This cross-border kinship means that India’s interactions with groups like the CNF will be closely watched by communities in Mizoram, who may push for stronger support for their kin across the border.

Similarly, Nagaland and Manipur have long been hotspots for insurgent activity, with groups like the NSCN and ULFA operating from bases in Myanmar. India’s engagement with Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups could have both positive and negative effects on these insurgencies. On one hand, closer cooperation with groups like the CNF could help India curb insurgent activity by cutting off safe havens in Myanmar. On the other hand, India’s perceived support for certain groups could inflame ethnic rivalries within its own borders, leading to heightened tensions between different communities.

Impact on Infrastructure and Trade

The Free Movement Regime (FMR) between India and Myanmar, which allows local populations in the border regions to travel up to 16 km across the border without a visa, has been an essential aspect of cross-border trade and community life. However, the instability in Myanmar since the coup has led to the suspension of the FMR, disrupting the livelihood of communities dependent on cross-border trade. This has particularly affected India’s Northeastern states, which have historically relied on trade with Myanmar for economic sustenance. The ongoing conflict in Myanmar has further hindered cross-border economic activities, impacting small traders and border communities who have been cut off from their traditional markets.

India’s “Act East” policy, which seeks to enhance connectivity and trade with Southeast Asia, relies heavily on infrastructure projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway. These projects are critical for improving regional integration and providing economic opportunities for India’s Northeast. However, the instability in Myanmar threatens the timely completion of these projects.

The Kaladan project, which aims to connect India’s Northeast with Myanmar and Southeast Asia via the Bay of Bengal, is particularly vulnerable. Delays in the completion of this project, due to the civil conflict and the lack of security in Myanmar, could hamper India’s ability to integrate its Northeastern states into broader regional trade networks. The disruption of these projects would also undermine India’s strategic objectives in Southeast Asia, weakening its ability to counterbalance China’s influence in the region.

Geopolitical Implications for the Region

India and China, the two largest powers in Asia, have long been in competition for influence in Myanmar due to its strategic geographic location and resource wealth. Myanmar shares borders with both countries, making it a key player in the regional geopolitical landscape. For China, Myanmar is essential for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which offers China direct access to the Indian Ocean through the deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu. This access reduces China’s dependency on the Malacca Strait for energy imports and trade, which is a vital chokepoint vulnerable to geopolitical tensions.

China has traditionally been Myanmar’s closest ally, providing the military regime with financial, military, and diplomatic support. Beijing has played a crucial role in backing Myanmar’s military leadership, particularly in the wake of the 2021 coup, and it has invested billions in infrastructure projects and natural resources, reinforcing its presence in the country. India, on the other hand, views Myanmar as a key component of its Act East policy, which aims to strengthen connectivity and economic ties with Southeast Asia. Moreover, Myanmar is essential for India’s regional security, particularly regarding the Northeast region and its insurgent groups that often seek refuge across the border.

India’s outreach to Myanmar’s anti-junta groups, including the National Unity Government (NUG) and various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), represents a strategic shift in countering China’s growing influence over Myanmar’s military regime. China has openly supported Myanmar’s junta since the 2021 coup, providing diplomatic cover at the United Nations and expanding its economic footprint within the country, especially through energy and infrastructure investments.

India’s engagement with Myanmar’s non-state actors serves several geopolitical purposes:

Diversifying Relations in Myanmar: By engaging with pro-democracy factions and EAOs, India is creating multiple channels of influence in Myanmar. This allows India to hedge its bets whether the military junta retains control or the opposition gains power, India will have established relationships that serve its strategic interests.

Counterbalancing China’s Influence: While China has been the dominant external player in Myanmar, India’s outreach to non-state actors weakens China’s monopoly on influence. By supporting forces that oppose the military junta, India can align itself with groups that are not in China’s orbit, potentially shifting the balance of power in the region.

Strengthening Regional Security: The civil conflict in Myanmar poses a direct threat to India’s security, particularly in its northeastern states. By engaging with anti-junta groups, India seeks to stabilize Myanmar and prevent Chinese-backed military dominance, which could embolden insurgent activities along its border. This engagement could help India gain support from these non-state actors in suppressing cross-border insurgencies, thereby reinforcing its security framework.

However, this approach carries risks. By aligning with Myanmar’s anti-junta forces, India may antagonize the military regime, potentially pushing it further into China’s sphere of influence. Beijing, which has maintained a largely transactional relationship with the junta, could consolidate its position in Myanmar, sidelining India in crucial infrastructure projects like the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and other BRI investments.

The Role of ASEAN: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a significant diplomatic role in attempting to mediate the political crisis in Myanmar following the 2021 coup. ASEAN’s “Five-Point Consensus” plan, agreed upon in April 2021, called for an immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue between all parties, and the appointment of a special envoy to facilitate peace talks. However, the plan has faced implementation challenges, as the Myanmar junta has shown little willingness to engage meaningfully with ASEAN’s diplomatic initiatives.

India’s engagement with Myanmar’s anti-junta forces adds a new layer to the regional dynamics. While ASEAN’s approach is centered around multilateral negotiations and maintaining stability in the region, India’s direct outreach to Myanmar’s opposition groups might be seen as diverging from ASEAN’s more cautious stance. This could have several implications:

Alignment with ASEAN’s Long-Term Goals: India’s support for the NUG and ethnic armed groups may ultimately align with ASEAN’s broader goal of restoring peace and democratic governance in Myanmar. If India’s engagement leads to greater dialogue between the opposition and the military regime, it could bolster ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts.

Potential Divergence: India’s actions could also be perceived as undermining ASEAN’s diplomatic process. By engaging directly with anti-junta groups, India risks sidelining ASEAN’s role as a neutral mediator, especially if it is viewed as taking sides in the conflict. This could create friction between India and ASEAN member states, particularly if the regional bloc prefers a more diplomatic and less confrontational approach toward Myanmar’s military.

Coordination Opportunities: There is also potential for India to coordinate with ASEAN, particularly in aligning its diplomatic outreach with the bloc’s efforts to pressure the junta. India’s position as a regional power gives it leverage to complement ASEAN’s initiatives by working behind the scenes to push for inclusive dialogue between Myanmar’s military, the NUG, and ethnic groups.

ASEAN remains the central diplomatic actor in Southeast Asia, and India’s actions will need to be carefully calibrated to avoid undermining regional stability. Nonetheless, India’s proactive engagement with non-state actors provides an alternative avenue for addressing the crisis, particularly as ASEAN struggles to enforce its consensus plan.

The Future of India-Myanmar Relations

India’s current balancing act engaging with both the military regime and opposition groups reflects its broader foreign policy pragmatism. However, this dual approach may come under strain depending on how Myanmar’s political landscape evolves.

Risks of Strained Military Relations: India’s engagement with Myanmar’s anti-junta forces could strain its longstanding relationship with the military regime. Historically, the military has been a crucial partner for India, particularly in maintaining border security and cooperation against insurgent groups operating in India’s Northeast. By supporting anti-junta factions, India risks antagonizing the military, which could reduce future security cooperation and compromise ongoing efforts to curb insurgency activities along the India-Myanmar border.

Impact on Infrastructure Projects: India’s strategic infrastructure projects in Myanmar, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, could be at risk if relations with the military regime deteriorate. These projects are crucial for India’s “Act East” policy, aimed at enhancing connectivity with Southeast Asia. Any backlash from the junta could delay or disrupt these projects, undermining India’s economic and strategic goals in the region. Furthermore, Myanmar’s military could retaliate by limiting India’s access to future infrastructure and trade initiatives, further complicating India’s regional strategy.

The risk of retaliation from Myanmar’s junta is a significant factor that India must consider as it engages with anti-junta forces. The military government, which still holds power, may perceive India’s support for the NUG and ethnic armed groups as a direct challenge to its legitimacy. This could result in several negative outcomes for India:

Deterioration of Diplomatic Ties: The junta could retaliate diplomatically by limiting India’s access to key projects or curbing cooperation on security issues. This would have a direct impact on India’s ability to manage insurgencies in the Northeast and secure its borders.

Economic Repercussions: The military regime could also curtail India’s involvement in economic ventures in Myanmar, including energy projects, mining, and infrastructure development. This could have long-term implications for India’s economic engagement with Southeast Asia, as well as its efforts to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region.

Escalation of Border Tensions: The junta could escalate tensions along the India-Myanmar border, particularly by allowing insurgent groups that operate from Myanmar to intensify their activities. This would pose a direct security threat to India’s Northeast and destabilize the region.

India will need to carefully navigate these risks as it engages with both the military regime and anti-junta groups. The future of India-Myanmar relations will depend on how well India can balance its long-term strategic interests with its immediate security and geopolitical concerns. Ultimately, maintaining flexibility and dialogue with all key stakeholders in Myanmar will be crucial for India’s ability to manage the evolving regional dynamics.

Lessons for Bangladesh

India’s recent engagement with non-state actors in Myanmar provides valuable lessons for Bangladesh, especially in how a nation can maintain a delicate balance between security concerns and regional influence. India’s decision to engage both the military junta and ethnic armed groups such as the National Unity Government (NUG), the Chin National Front (CNF), and others reflects a pragmatic approach that ensures it remains a key player in Myanmar’s future political landscape, regardless of who holds power.

For Bangladesh, this strategy is significant because it faces similar challenges with non-state actors and insurgent groups along its borders. In particular, Bangladesh has dealt with ethnic tensions in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and armed insurgencies in its southeastern region. India’s nuanced approach of engaging both state and non-state actors to secure its borders and maintain regional influence suggests that Bangladesh could also benefit from engaging diplomatically with various stakeholders in conflict zones.

Rather than solely relying on military operations, Bangladesh can adopt a more multi-layered strategy that involves dialogue with armed groups, local community leaders, and neighboring countries. This could help mitigate the risk of insurgencies gaining ground while also positioning Bangladesh as a stabilizing force in the region. Furthermore, building relationships with non-state actors could provide Bangladesh with valuable intelligence, enabling it to manage cross-border security risks more effectively.

Bangladesh shares certain similarities with India when it comes to managing insurgencies and ethnic armed groups, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), which has experienced armed conflict over autonomy and land rights. One lesson from India’s approach is the importance of addressing the underlying grievances that fuel insurgency, such as ethnic marginalization, land disputes, and economic disenfranchisement.

By adopting a balanced approach, Bangladesh could initiate confidence-building measures with insurgent groups and ethnic minorities, possibly through development initiatives, political autonomy agreements, or dialogue that recognizes their grievances. Just as India engages with non-state actors to secure its borders and counter external threats from Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations, Bangladesh could benefit from a strategy that combines military preparedness with political engagement. This would not only improve border security but also contribute to long-term peace and stability in regions like the CHT, where insurgencies have historically disrupted the area’s development.

Security Implications for the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)

The situation in India’s Northeast shares similarities with the challenges Bangladesh faces in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Both regions are characterized by ethnic diversity, cross-border insurgency, and the presence of armed groups. In Northeast India, the cross-border flow of insurgent groups, especially from Myanmar, has historically created security challenges for India, just as Bangladesh has faced insurgent activities from ethnic groups in the CHT.

One critical lesson Bangladesh can learn from India’s handling of the Northeast is its dual approach to insurgency: military containment combined with political dialogue. India has often conducted military operations against insurgent groups while simultaneously engaging in peace talks and autonomy agreements with certain factions, offering them a political stake in the state’s future. In the case of the CHT, Bangladesh has already implemented the 1997 Peace Accord, which granted limited autonomy to the region’s ethnic groups. However, challenges remain, particularly with armed groups that continue to resist the full implementation of the agreement.

Another shared challenge is the management of refugees. Northeast India has witnessed a growing influx of refugees from Myanmar due to the ongoing civil war. Similarly, Bangladesh has faced waves of refugees from Myanmar’s Rohingya population, which has strained local resources and security in areas like Cox’s Bazar. India’s experience in handling refugees, particularly in balancing humanitarian needs with security risks, can offer Bangladesh valuable lessons. Bangladesh could adopt more structured policies to manage refugee inflows, ensuring that the local economy and security forces are not overwhelmed by the demands of refugee populations.

Bangladesh can draw on India’s approach to mitigate potential threats in the CHT. Specifically, the following measures could be adopted:

Strengthening Cross-Border Cooperation: India’s cooperation with Myanmar in conducting joint military operations against insurgents could be mirrored in Bangladesh’s approach to the CHT. By working with Myanmar on shared security concerns, particularly the movement of armed groups across the border, Bangladesh can enhance its ability to contain cross-border insurgencies.

Increased Autonomy and Development: India’s engagement with its ethnic groups through autonomy agreements in states like Nagaland and Mizoram offers a template for further implementing the 1997 Peace Accord in the CHT. Bangladesh could focus on expanding political autonomy for ethnic groups, ensuring that local leaders have a greater stake in regional governance, which could reduce the appeal of insurgency.

Economic Development as a Security Strategy: India’s focus on regional development projects in its Northeast has been critical in improving security and integrating marginalized areas into the national economy. Bangladesh could similarly prioritize infrastructure development in the CHT to address the economic grievances that fuel insurgency, offering local populations greater opportunities for livelihood and reducing their reliance on armed resistance.

Leveraging External Engagement for Development

India’s experience with the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) offers Bangladesh a valuable example of how to balance large-scale development projects with regional security concerns. The KMTTP, which connects India’s Northeast with Myanmar’s Rakhine State, has been a strategic project for India, enhancing connectivity while also presenting security challenges due to insurgent activity in the region.

Bangladesh, too, has significant development projects in regions like the CHT, which face security risks from insurgent groups. By leveraging external engagement, such as partnerships with neighboring countries or international organizations, Bangladesh can ensure that its development projects in the CHT and other regions are not derailed by security concerns. For instance, Bangladesh could pursue more trilateral cooperation with India and Myanmar to address cross-border security issues while continuing its development agenda.

Bangladesh could also learn from India’s efforts to integrate security frameworks into development projects, ensuring that infrastructure and economic initiatives in vulnerable regions like the CHT are accompanied by enhanced border security, intelligence-sharing, and counter-insurgency measures.

Just as India’s engagement with Myanmar’s non-state actors serves as a key part of its broader diplomatic efforts in Southeast Asia, Bangladesh can benefit from enhancing its regional diplomacy to support its security and development objectives. Regional diplomacy, particularly with neighbors like India and Myanmar, can help Bangladesh address both immediate security threats and long-term development goals.

For instance, Bangladesh could strengthen its participation in regional forums such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), using this platform to address regional security concerns, enhance connectivity projects, and attract international investment for development initiatives in the CHT and beyond. Bangladesh’s efforts to balance security and development will be more successful if they are backed by strong diplomatic ties and regional cooperation, ensuring that neighboring countries have a shared stake in maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Moreover, Bangladesh’s ability to engage with broader international organizations such as the United Nations and ASEAN, particularly in dealing with the Rohingya crisis, will be essential in managing both the humanitarian and security dimensions of its development projects.

Policy Recommendations for Bangladesh

India’s engagement with Myanmar’s non-state actors provides Bangladesh with a pragmatic model for dealing with insurgent groups and ethnic armed organizations in conflict-prone areas, such as the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Instead of relying solely on military operations, Bangladesh can build diplomatic channels with non-state actors, including insurgent groups and local ethnic leaders. By opening avenues for dialogue, Bangladesh can address the grievances that often drive insurgency, such as demands for autonomy, economic marginalization, and cultural preservation.

Confidence-Building Measures: Implementing confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as development projects, land rights reforms, and local autonomy agreements, could help de-escalate tensions with insurgent groups. Offering these groups a political stake in the region’s governance could reduce the reliance on armed conflict.

Utilizing Civil Society Organizations: Bangladesh can engage civil society organizations (CSOs) and local NGOs to act as intermediaries between the government and non-state actors. This approach can create trust and help pave the way for more formal negotiations in conflict zones like the CHT.

By creating diplomatic engagement opportunities with insurgent groups, Bangladesh can replicate India’s strategy of balancing military actions with political dialogue, reducing the long-term risks of insurgency and fostering stability in its border regions.

Strengthening Regional Security Cooperation

Bangladesh’s geographic location makes it vulnerable to the cross-border impacts of conflicts in Myanmar and India’s Northeastern region. Coordinating with neighboring countries is essential to managing security threats such as insurgency, arms trafficking, and refugee inflows. India’s strategy of engaging Myanmar’s anti-junta groups while maintaining cooperation with the military regime offers a model for how Bangladesh can navigate these complexities.

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Trilateral Border Security Cooperation: Bangladesh should advocate for increased trilateral security cooperation between India, Myanmar, and itself. Joint patrols, intelligence-sharing, and cross-border military operations could help control insurgent movements, arms smuggling, and illegal trade along shared borders.

Refugee Crisis Management: Bangladesh has faced significant challenges due to the influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. Working with India and Myanmar, Bangladesh can advocate for regional solutions to the refugee crisis, ensuring that humanitarian efforts are coordinated and that refugee camps do not become breeding grounds for insurgency.

Institutionalizing Regional Security Dialogue: Bangladesh can take the lead in institutionalizing a regional security dialogue platform, involving India and Myanmar, to address cross-border security concerns, insurgent activity, and regional stability. This could be facilitated through existing regional frameworks like BIMSTEC or new bilateral agreements.

Strengthening Engagement with ASEAN: Although Bangladesh is not a member of ASEAN, it can seek observer status or develop closer ties with the bloc to address the regional instability caused by Myanmar’s civil war. ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar offers a framework that Bangladesh can support, particularly in advocating for dialogue and humanitarian assistance.

Leveraging International Support for Refugee Management: Bangladesh should continue to work closely with international organizations like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to manage the ongoing Rohingya crisis. Bangladesh can advocate for more sustainable solutions, including international funding for refugee camps and resettlement programs.

Engaging with BIMSTEC for Regional Development: Bangladesh’s participation in BIMSTEC can be expanded to focus on regional security and development projects. BIMSTEC can provide a forum for addressing the instability caused by Myanmar’s conflict, including the coordination of development initiatives in the Bay of Bengal region that benefit multiple countries.

Conclusion

India’s evolving engagement with Myanmar’s non-state actors represents a significant shift in its foreign policy, aimed at balancing regional security concerns with its broader geopolitical interests. By engaging both the military junta and ethnic armed groups such as the National Unity Government (NUG), Chin National Front (CNF), and Arakan Army (AA), India is positioning itself as a key player in Myanmar’s future political landscape. This pragmatic approach allows India to navigate the complex power dynamics while countering China’s growing influence in the region. However, this strategy carries risks, including potential retaliation from Myanmar’s military and the destabilization of Northeast India due to cross-border insurgent activities.

For the broader region, especially neighboring countries like Bangladesh, India’s engagement with Myanmar’s non-state actors has ripple effects. It highlights the challenges of managing insurgencies, refugee crises, and border security in a volatile geopolitical environment. India’s balancing act offers valuable lessons for Bangladesh, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), where insurgency and ethnic tensions remain persistent issues.

For Bangladesh, adopting a strategic and balanced approach, similar to India’s, is essential for addressing its own security, developmental, and geopolitical challenges. Engaging with non-state actors through dialogue, strengthening regional security cooperation, and ensuring that development projects in sensitive areas are fortified against instability are key steps Bangladesh can take. Moreover, leveraging multilateral platforms and international diplomacy will help Bangladesh navigate the complex regional dynamics caused by Myanmar’s civil war, ensuring that its security and development objectives are safeguarded.

[1] PhD Researcher, Bangladesh University of Professionals.